Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000500010049-5		

31 July 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR


STAT

SUBJECT: Suggestions for a Proposed Book on Communism

The following is a rough outline for a book which incorporates my understanding of what you have in mind for inclusion, and also adds some lines of argument which occur to me as likely to increase the value and influence of such a work.

Section I - Introduction on the historical origins of the Communist Party and the true nature of its political philosophy and program. This might consist of two chapters. The first should sketch the rise of the Communist Party, emphasizing that it developed from the special conditions of political struggle obtaining in Russia in the latter half of the 19th century. Hence its conspiratorial character, its addiction to secrecy and violence, its preference for an elite directing corps as contrasted with the mass democratic movements of the Western tradition. One could refer to the psychopathic dictatorial instincts of both Lenin and Stalin, reflecting this special political environment from which they sprang. The point of this exposition would be to refute the CPSU's claim to represent the mainstream of the development of Marxist ideas. In fact, Bolshevism was a deviation from the main body of Marxist thought and fastened on to Marxism many characteristically Russian features which wholly distorted it.

In developing this line of argument I am thinking of the impact one might have on intellectuals in underdeveloped countries, many of whom are naive Marxists who readily



accept the CPSU's claim to be the fountainhead of the true Marxist faith. They can be made aware that at its origins the Russian Communist Party departed from the main body of Marxism, and did so mainly because of its anti-democratic character.

A second chapter could then go on to delineate the central operative principle of CPSU policy - the acquisition of power. It can be shown how historically the party came to focus on this one aim to the exclusion of all the democratic-humanitarian goals which were a part of the heritage of traditional Marxism. Domestically, the policy of the Soviet state has always placed human welfare at the bottom of its list of priorities and the expansion of regime power at the top. All of its measures have been conceived in this spirit and many have involved inflicting vast cruelties on the Soviet people. Communist theorists themselves in their more candid moments always phrase the central political question in Lenin's famous formula: "Who-Whom?", i.e., who is going to dominate and destroy whom, which faction, party, state is going to establish its absolute power.

Again, this is a characteristically Russian political philosophy, springing from an historical environment which knew nothing but absolutism and tyranny. It is ignorant of that essential insight about power which other cultures have acquired, that the general welfare requires the limitation and distribution of power. Thus Soviet policy on the world scale is a policy of imperialism, whereas what the modern world community requires, in the interest of all, is recognition of the autonomy of separate national communities and a spirit of accommodation among them.

Section II - Against the above background, there could then be a series of chapters which deal with the instrumentalities which the Soviet state and the CPSU employ to prosecute their central aim of aggrandizing the power of the Soviet state. These

- ₹ -

could run as follows: a) Military and Economic Power of the Bloc; b) Soviet Diplomacy; c) Espionage; d) Prepagands in all its forms; e) The network of CP's around the world; f) Fronts and various slogans; g) Peace movement; h) Youth organizations, etc.

Others who know more about this than I do will enlarge on the vast amount of illustrative material which can be supplied under these headings. I would suggest only that all these activities be portrayed as designed to serve the central aim of splitting and destroying potential oppositions and building positions of decisive power under Moscow's control.

Soviets' keen understanding of the psychological dimensions of power, that is, their recognition that the magnitude of power held and manipulated by a party or state is what people think it is. In many situations the Communists have persuaded their enemies to concede to them simply because they had seemed to be irresistible, and they were thus spared an actual test of power which might have upset their pretensions.

This section might conclude with a chapter illustrating the Communist technique for seizure of power. The Czech coup or some hypothetical case might be used

Section III - The final section of the book could deal with the methods, techniques, organizational principles necessary to those who wish successfully to resist the Communists. Again, others will have more to offer on this subject than I can. But I would emphasize the necessity, for all effective anti-Communist activity, of understanding the nature of Communist aims and techniques which will have been described in the first two sections of the book. This section could also include illustrative material showing how effective resistance has been organized. The cases



which come readily to mind would include Berlin 1945-46 (in fact, down to the present), France and Italy in the early post-war years, and Greece. If we are lucky and the book takes some time to complete the case of Iraq may yet prove apropos, and there would be great advantage in having a non-European country illustrated. In any case, the book should end on a strong positive note, shewing how resolute men, once they understand the nature and methods of this enemy, can deal with him effectively.

Office of National Estimates

STAT